It is argued that structural change rarely delivers and that working through people and paying due attention to their motivations and moral imperatives will more likely produce benefits to organisations, staff, and patients. 2005: The PCT has come together as an organisation that staff feel good about. The staff survey showed that the PCT was in the top 5 nationally. The Christmas party had two live bands: One included a staff member and
the other the husband of the PCT chair. One hundred eighty people took part, and there was a waiting list. The majority of ethnographic studies on the NHS as a system in constant flux have been carried out by outsiders who immerse themselves in the organisation and thus gain an in-depth perspective of the processes and dynamics of organisational change. 1, 2 This has resulted in insightful studies that offer theoretical frameworks to understand the complex interactions between a range of factors that can drive or inhibit change. Pettigrew et al 3 outlined eight key dimensions that influenced whether receptive contexts for change could be established: quality and coherence of policy, availability of key people to lead change, intensity and scale of long-term environmental pressure, supportive organisational culture, effective managerial-clinical relations, cooperative interorganisational networks, simplicity, and clarity of goals and priorities, fit between change agenda and locale. Even though their work is 26 years old, Pettigrew and colleagues' conceptual framework remains highly relevant 4, 5 and serves as the foundation for the analysis in this paper. The dimensions highlighted in the more recent realist review of large system transformation in health care by Best and colleagues 6 are: blend designated leadership with distributed leadership, establish feedback loops, attend to history, engage physicians, and include patients and families. These dimensions can be mapped onto the Pettigrew and colleagues' framework, with the latter allowing a more nuanced analysis, and therefore, their concepts will be drawn upon.
A further theoretical reference point will be decentred theory which in the words of key proponents 7 "examines the ways in which patterns of rule, including both institutions and policies, are created, sustained and modified by individuals and through their meaningful social practices" (p. 6). In this approach, they move away from formal explanatory frameworks and instead focus their interest on the importance of historical and context-specific meanings.
Thus, while the dimensions highlighted by Pettigrew and colleagues are important for anchoring my analysis, the more contingent approach from Bevir and Waring allows a complex understanding of how the idea of PCTs has been interpreted and operationalised by relevant actors and groupings.
The distinctiveness of this paper lies in the fact that it provides a theory-informed analysis of my lived experience as a PCT chair of health care organisational change over a period of 8 years. By drawing on robust conceptual frameworks, this analysis transcends personal anecdote and attempts to provide a multilayered, longitudinal, and complex interpretation of organisational change. Because this is an account of my tenure as an NHS leader, I will write in the first person singular. I have not anonymised the examples as it would be easy to find out the PCTs involved from my name as the author.
| A NOTE ON METHOD
When I was appointed as the Chair designate in October 2001, I began a notebook that served as a diary and a "homework" book of tasks that needed to be accomplished. Alongside this everyday notebook, I created a second ONG e935 one dedicated to visits to service areas, including GP practices. The visits consisted either of loosely structured discussions with staff groups or "shadowing" individual professionals for half days. Further visits to key stakeholders such as local authorities, members of Parliament, third sector, and so on were also recorded but are not included in this analysis. These notebooks were not set up as research tools, yet retrospectively can serve as detailed aide memoires. With regard to the broader policy context, relevant documents will be referred to when necessary.
| A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF PRIMARY CARE TRUSTS
The precursors to PCTs lie in a number of key changes, starting with the introduction of NHS general management resulting from the report by Sir Roy Griffiths. 8 This was followed by the creation of the purchaser-provider split as the Thatcher government believed in the power of a so-called internal market to drive up productivity and quality of services. This led in the 1990s to the creation of GP Fundholding whereby GPs were given a budget for their practice population so that "money could follow the patient". The Labour government came to power in 1997 with the promise to abolish GP Fundholding as they felt it had exacerbated inequalities in access to care. Instead, they created Primary Care Groups that were led by GPs and covered larger geographical areas, but by 2001, these were not considered of sufficient scale to counterbalance the power of providers. This led to the establishment of PCTs bringing together several PCGs and community services with a Trust structure of a unitary board and a Professional Executive
Committee as the clinically led "engine room".
| CREATION OF FIRST PCT
The preparation for setting up the new PCT started in October 2001 with the plan agreed between myself as the Chair designate and the Strategic Health Authority (SHA). One of the key decisions was that the appointment of the new Chief Executive Officer (CEO) would involve staff and GP practices. Initially, the SHA was against this idea as it was not common practice and not adopted by other chairs designate. I made the argument that wider involvement would be positive in two ways: First, community unit staff were sceptical about another reorganisation and felt that they were asked to give up their identity as a Community Trust. If they could play a part in appointing their new leader, resistance might be lessened. Second, the support of GP practices was pivotal because they worried that their influence could be reduced by creating an organisation that was not primarily led by GPs-as was the predecessor Primary Care Group. Again, being party to selecting the CEO could make them feel they "owned" the decision.
The appointment process consisted of a presentation by each candidate of their vision for the PCT, attended by staff and GP representatives (selected by their own professional groups), and a formal interview by the Chair and PEC Chair designate, Nonexecutive Director designate, CEO of the SHA, Local Authority CEO, and Chair of another PCT.
The views of the staff representatives were fed back to the interview panel as part of their decision framework. The brief diary note following the appointment decision read:
"Appointment of CEO: great enthusiasm of staff about involvement; unanimous decision of panel and staff;
GPs on board" (17 January 2002).
With the CEO starting part time from February 2002, the appointments for senior management posts could begin. The Director of Finance and Director of Public Health were appointed without any problems, but the appointment of one senior appointment proved to be difficult. The process took place in April, and staff were involved again in the presentation by candidates. Two members from the PEC were on the appointment panel. The internal candidate was not appointed and the diary note read as follows:
"Did not appoint internal candidate. Poor presentation/interview. Staff involved: feedback was that presentation was poor but wanted to appoint candidate because of her past performance and As is clear from the note, there was considerable anger because the community staff wanted continuity and a sense of security that their culture would be carried over into the new organisation. Several discussions took place between the CEO and staff, with the help of the Head of Human Resources, emphasising that appointments are based on candidates' performance and not on prior knowledge, in order to establish a level playing field. This was a difficult message, in particular as the candidate wanted to remain in the PCT. It was agreed that she would be supported in personal development and that staff would be involved in reviewing the job description and future appointment process. In due course, the post was filled by a candidate who had considerable experience of interdisciplinary and cross-organisational working.
With the senior executive team and nonexecutive directors in place, a development workshop took place to agree the key principles for working together as a unitary board. The need was identified to formulate the value base for the PCT strategy and its decision making which led to two outcomes: first, a set of principles which would guide the board and all staff. These focused on reducing inequalities, enhancing health and well-being, and improving access to and quality of services. Second, a priority setting framework that would be used for commissioning decisions based upon these principles and clinical and cost-effectiveness evidence. The underlying drivers for change were the facts that despite the perception of Cheshire as an affluent county with higher than average levels of health, the inequalities in health and well-being between and within towns, rural poverty, and the needs of BME communities tended to be obscured.
The ambition to be a value-driven PCT had a direct impact on organisational change with commissioning for wellbeing turning a provider-led culture into one that focused on health need by working across sectors and disciplines and with direct links to local communities. In order to make a clear statement that the PCT was a new organisation with a distinct community-facing philosophy, a launch event was held for a wide range of local partners and communities involving all staff. The symbolic value of publicly stating the goals and priorities of the PCT should not be underestimated as it sets the tone for building collaborative networks, demonstrated visible leadership, and provided clarity of purpose, both internally and externally.
The CEO and Chair embarked on a visiting programme starting early 2002 and to be continued throughout the life of Central Cheshire PCT (CCPCT). This encompassed 30 GP practices, independent contractors such as dentists, pharmacists, and opticians, and all community staff groups. It also included half day shadowing of key professionals by the Chair with the purpose of familiarising herself with the everyday work of community staff and "taking the temperature" of their feelings of working within the PCT. This level of visibility of the PCT leadership was considered positive, coupled with an "open door" policy both physically and through email. The latter was necessary given the wide geographical footprint and thus the dispersed nature of primary care and community facilities.
The visits to GP practices were important given that they might potentially feel sidelined through the restructuring from PCGs to PCT. For example, a GP expressed anger at the abolition of the PCG and felt that GPs were being "ignored" (diary note, 30 January 2002). A big issue to emerge from GP visits was the fact that many premises were not fit for purpose with many practices having outgrown their space as they expanded the range of services. As a result, the PCT embarked on an ambitious building programme which resulted in eight purpose-built health centres, which all bar one housed multiple practices. Most included community services and a pharmacy, with some extending to social services and third sector. I discuss one particular development in order to illustrate the challenges involved in building new premises.
| Example 1: Building a health and well-being centre
In Crewe town centre, three practices operated: Two shared the same outdated building and one occupied a 10-yearold health centre. Discussions started in 2003 whether the three practices would want to move together to a new ONG e937
building, and in 2004, a range of options were explored. Not all GPs were happy about moving as they were concerned that their patients would find it more difficult to get to the surgery and that they would lose their practice identity. After many deliberations, the option favoured by the practices, the local council, and the PCT was a site next to a supermarket and leisure complex, just outside of the town centre because the land available would be able to accommodate a large integrated centre with car parking. The main problem was its location away from where the practices were situated, and no public transport was as yet available. Opposition from the practice populations was considerable, and a number of public meetings did not yield sufficient agreement about the plans. The PCT then asked the local MP, the late Gwyneth Dunwoody, to chair the public meetings as she was well respected by the community. She successfully managed to balance patient and public opinion with policy and managerial objectives. Importantly, she brokered a number of amendments: The third sector agreed to play a role in the new development, and the local council altered the bus route with a stop created near the new building. The three practices wanted to maintain their distinct identities but accepted a flexible layout which would allow future mergers to be made without major physical restructuring. The result was a health and well-being centre that was community facing with a large atrium that contained a café run by a Community Interest Company, a computer hub that patients could use to access information and where regular computer classes were held. The local pharmacy moved into the building with space for third-sector services such as counselling and welfare advice.
Improving primary care premises is key to high-quality care, but a number of potentially conflicting interests can come into play. In this case, the community facing nature of the centre could have been compromised by it not being sufficiently accessible for all sections of the community. GP practices, keen to protect their identity, set spatial boundaries and were wary of the presence of the community café thinking that it would create mess and noise.
The PCT felt that the benefits to well-being of volunteers and clients outweighed potential problems. It required the intervention from a respected leader such as the local MP to overcome the various barriers to implementation.
| Embedding a new culture
The tripartite leadership between CEO, Chair, and PEC Chair developed into a close working partnership, meeting once a week to discuss strategic issues bringing the specific perspectives to the The ambition to be a community-facing organisation was realised in different ways: The Community Health Council (and its successor body Healthwatch) played an active part on the PCT board, and the public could ask questions at the board meetings. Regular open public meetings were held to discuss issues relevant to particular e938 ONG communities, and topic-specific meetings were organised where necessary. Each new premises proposal was extensively discussed with local populations, councillors, and MPs, and any counter proposals were seriously considered.
Again, involving communities was hard work, and reaching compromises often included contestation, and ensuing decisions could be constrained by time and externally imposed deadlines. Sometimes, individuals or interest groups were left dissatisfied and challenged the PCT's legitimacy. The Chair and/or CEO then had to engage in further debate and justify the PCT's decision making. The robust working relationship with Healthwatch facilitated solving difficult issues, and in those cases, further backup from either clinicians, the SHA, or local MPs proved to be valuable.
In summary, the initial reservations from GPs and resistance from community unit staff were superseded by the energy that creating a new organisation released. The dimensions for organisational change that were critical included simplicity of vision and strategy with all staff knowing the key value principles, strong and distributed leadership, productive clinician-manager relationships, and a facilitative style of management.
| MERGER OF TWO PCTS
In 2006, the government policy of reducing overhead costs and making PCTs "more focused organisations" led to mergers across England. These were led top-down, and involvement of PCTs and other stakeholders was limited.
Protracted discussions about the configuration of PCTs took place, and proposals changed regularly which made forward planning almost impossible fuelling a sense of disengagement. The decision to merge Central and Eastern
Cheshire PCTs (CECPCT) was made very close to the deadline. Senior executive staff had to reapply for their jobs, and as a result of streamlining the structure there were more people than posts. The CEO of Central Cheshire on the previous ECPCT board. Given that an organisational culture is carried by people, it was obviously difficult to move the balance away from the CCPCT ethos. An organisation-wide programme was devised comprising whole board workshops setting a new strategic direction and value-based approach, workshops with different groups of staff and comprehensive communications networking. Third, the merger resulted in financial pressure because the ECPCT deficit had to be carried over into the new PCT. This created a strained internal and external dynamic: Internally, CCPCT staff felt that they were "dragged down" from a financially healthy position and therefore resenting the merger; externally, the relationship with the SHA changed with our "freedom to act" being curtailed as the focus shifted to achieving financial balance. In turn, the board and especially the NEDs were anxious to respond to the demands from the SHA by moving attention away from longer term aims such as health improvement and reducing health inequalities. This resulted in tensions within board and in particular between the Chair and some NEDs, and this continued to bedevil effective board working throughout the life of CECPCT (see example 3 below). Fourth, the PEC experienced growing divisions between those GPs who adopted a general population perspective versus those who focused on their practice population, leading to different commissioning priorities. Together, these factors mitigated against the creation of an integrated organisation, and the sense of a "Central" and an "East" identity remained strong.
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When reflecting on the merger, the CEO wrote: "We were really happy with the culture in CCPCT but we were uncomfortable with the culture in ECPCT and in order to change the ECPCT culture we were required to develop a new culture for the whole of the merged organisation. I'm not sure that we fully understood or anticipated the challenge in this. The REACH principles [PCT value principles] were a good example of this -we were all comfortable with these in CCPCT and most of us could say what they stood for -but with the new CECPCT we needed to build a new set of principles to ensure it didn't feel like a takeover and the new set never took hold!" (Email 24 August 2018).
6.1 | Example 2: Community involvement in developing a new health and well-being centre
The creation of the new CECPCT brought a renewed focus on the quality of primary care premises and a review of the eastern patch. Knutsford town emerged as one location where several GP practices operated from converted houses that could not be developed into modern primary care centres. Two practices were based in the town centre and two in Longridge towards the northern end of the town, serving a population that was economically poorer than the more well-heeled central Knutsford population. Based upon a robust public health-led needs assessment,
CECPCT formulated a proposal to locate a purpose-built health centre in Longridge.
In the same way as in the previous CCPCT, a comprehensive GP practice and community involvement approach was developed. Discussions with the central GP practices were difficult as they did not want to move from their current location, and felt that they served a clientele that fundamentally differed from the Longridge practice. Thus, they preferred improvements to their premises, but CECPCT did not feel that this was cost-effective and also could not address a number of disabled access issues. The Longridge practices were positive as they could see the possibilities for developing a multidisciplinary, multiagency centre tackling health and social needs in a more comprehensive manner.
Numerous community meetings were held which did not lead to a consensus between the two parts of
Knutsford. This culminated in a large public meeting in Summer 2009 led by the CEO and Chair. Unlike in earlier smaller meetings, none of the GPs wanted to colead the meetings as they were worried about "sticking their necks out" and potentially alienating some of their own patients. More than 300 people packed into the meeting venue, and the majority were vocally opposed to siting the new facility in Longridge because in the words of one opponent, "this is not part of Knutsford". The predominantly middle-class, middle-aged audience literally drowned out the CEO speaking by banging walking sticks on the floor. The end result of this community involvement approach was disagreement as to the geographical site.
The Knutsford exercise was a failure because the public health evidence obviously did not convince the two GP practices, and the local community that redressing inequalities was more important than convenience of access and practice identity. On the contrary, the feeling expressed strongly was one that excluded certain sections of their community. Consequently, we felt that a decision had to be based on the PCT's principles which meant that a needsbased approach and tackling health inequality trumped access and convenience for a section of the community, and no new centre was created in Knutsford.
| Example 3: Clinical developments
During Fundholding, a GP practice in Macclesfield had established a clinical partnership with a private company for diabetes care which gave the practice financial benefit alongside better access for patients. They had continued this arrangement in the ECPCT period. Following the merger, CECPCT formulated a proposal to deliver the services across the eastern patch with the community diabetes team. The service would provide a universal package of care with the Macclesfield model as an added service within. After discussion between the practice and the relevant CECPCT manager, she sent an email to the practice with the agreement to a shared service. The practice did not e940 ONG respond, but 6 weeks later, an email arrived from the practice to say they had not agreed. At a subsequent general meeting with CECPCT nursing staff, the lead GP "denigrated the diabetic specialist service" (diary note 12 August 2008). The PCT then told the GP practice that if they wanted to continue with their separate service, they had to put forward a business case to the PEC. This did not happen, and the shared service was implemented.
This example demonstrated the power of vested (financial) interests and the longevity of certain ways of thinking like GP Fundholding which focused on benefits to the practice itself and its patients. The tension with the population-based perspective meant that the clinician-managerial interface did not develop in a positive direction. The executive had to impose a decision that was in keeping with the PCT's values. In 2007, a new system for assessing the performance of PCTs was introduced entitled World Class Commissioning (WCC). PCTs were to be rated against a set of criteria that aimed to provide a comprehensive picture of the structure, process, and outcomes of its commissioning function. In preparation for the first assessment in 2008, PCTs could call on support from outside consultancy firms, but PCTs had to pay for this themselves. We decided that given the PCTs' financial position, the fees were too expensive and the benefit uncertain. We were not wholly convinced that WCC would provide a true picture of our work, and interpreted it as a reflection of the growing "tyranny of transparency". 9 Strathern quotes Tsoukas who states that "the information society strives to turn all knowledge into information, and in doing so undermines the human capacity of understanding" (p. unease that we were no longer a "holistic" organisation. Furthermore, three NEDs started to openly criticise the executives and threatened with a vote of no confidence in the Chair and CEO. I felt disappointed, and I made it clear that in a unitary board, responsibility was shared, but tensions with three NEDs remained as they appeared more concerned about their personal position. One expressed this very clearly when stating that "his individual responsibility for good governance was more important than corporateness" (diary note, 20 October 2009). Several attempts were made to repair relationships, and NEDs were invited to be more closely involved in formulating the sustainability plan. While the critical NEDs ostensibly appeared to be reassured, mutual trust between them and the Chair and executive team was fundamentally undermined.
Reflecting on this example, the main issues were the environmental pressure and the fractures within the leadership (board). The Secretary of State had become increasingly bullish about delivery, and this filtered down the NHS organisational layers allowing a more strident managerial style to be adopted. The financial pressures were interpreted by some NEDs as a threat to their personal credibility and survival leading them to relinquish corporate behaviour, thus weakening the leadership. Ironically, the second WCC assessment had been positive as we had learned the "script", even though no fundamental changes had been made to our approach and service quality.
| DISCUSSION
The timeline from 2002 to 2010 appears short when considering the amount of changes during that period, but the pace of change in the NHS has accelerated in the last two decades. Witnessing and shaping this from within has provided me with a unique opportunity, but one that poses considerable analytical difficulty not unlike the one I described in an earlier paper. 10 The dilemma I encountered this time stemmed from being an insider as the PCT Chair with a vested interest in implementing structural and cultural change, while at the same time reflecting on the different perspectives of key actors in these processes. How could I do the latter in a balanced way, while optimising the fact that I had privileged access? As outlined in the introduction, I will be aided by drawing on the conceptual framework formulated by Pettigrew and colleagues, 3 and the decentred approach by Bevir and Waring. 7 The latter highlight that actors are influenced by, but simultaneously shape contexts over time, and thus, the changes I described above can be differently interpreted and acted upon. I will try to do justice to the complexity of multiple experiences, perspectives, and actions while creating a degree of order by adopting Pettigrew and colleagues' concepts.
Not all dimensions outlined by Pettigrew and colleagues are relevant to my discussion, but the availability of people to lead change has figured strongly in the creation of the first PCT. The tripartite leadership invested in its own relationships by weekly meetings and from this basis of mutual trust was able to formulate a coherent philosophy of facilitative management. This supportive organisational culture meant that clinicians, and in particular GPs and community staff, felt that they were backed in their ambitions while at the same time working within an overall framework of tackling health inequalities and improving people's well-being.
The merger of the two PCTs demonstrated the obverse: The strong leadership was viewed as an imposition by the GPs and staff from the Eastern Cheshire PCT, and as a threat to their organisational culture. Resistance to change was on the one hand "low level" by continuing with established patterns of working and bureaucratic procedures, and on the other hand, it was explicit as the example of the Knutsford aborted premises development showed. The longevity of certain ways of thinking such as clinical priorities taken precedence over managerial ones became obvious.
The Macclesfield diabetic example demonstrated the enduring philosophy from GP Fundholding that inhibited acceptance of a population needs-based approach.
Effective clinical-managerial relationships were pivotal to the success of the PCTs as commissioners, and this was most clearly borne out within the PEC and the collaboration between GP practices and the PCT. The PEC Chair had the difficult task to bridge the managerial-clinical interface by maintaining credibility as a "jobbing GP" while simultaneously representing PCT policy and strategy. He was regularly challenged but in CCPCT managed this delicate balance because he was trusted as a GP from one of the bigger practices. His position became more difficult after the e942 ONG merger with the previous PEC chair from ECPCT sitting on the merged PEC and preserving his own power base. Furthermore, the GPs in CCPCT felt that the merger had adversely affected their relationship with CECPCT. In the words of one GP "the PCT had become more top-down. Too little attention was paid to individual practices and their creativity. Flexibility had reduced. The PCT should reflect on how it engaged in the past and use that knowledge" (diary note 22 July 2008). In short, the merger made it harder for the leadership to remain in touch with GPs, and the PCT's relationship with them suffered across the whole patch.
In CCPCT, the formulation of key principles and a priority setting framework adhered to the Pettigrew and colleagues' idea of simplicity and clarity of goals and priorities. Achieving simplicity was complicated and required considerable contestation and compromise, but resulted in buy-in across the PCT and its stakeholders. The merger demanded a review of all the foundation documents, not only because it brought together two PCTs but also a new board. Countervailing forces to achieve a new coherent vision were, first, the perceived quick succession of structural changes in that the PCTs were barely established as commissioners trusted by previous GP Fundholders, as managers of community services and public health led organisations; second, the feeling that the merger was imposed top-down rather than organically grown; third, new financial pressures shifted managerial attention away from a community focus, bottom-up innovation, and "soft" activities such as interorganisational collaboration. Fourth, the environmental pressure manifested itself in several ways: from the centre (through the SHA) pressure increased over time, culminating in the WCC exercise and the persistent lack of achieving financial targets. This was exacerbated by the difficulties of the two local acute providers in maintaining service levels; the reorganisation of the local authority during 2008 caused a decision-making vacuum, in particular regarding social care, with adverse effect on partnership working and NHS delivery. Taking these factors together, CECPCT never arrived at the point of being an integrated organisation with a coherent vision, and consequently, the struggles within the board continued throughout the life of the PCT. This weakened the impact of the tripartite leadership on delivery of the core objectives of reducing health inequalities and improving well-being.
| CONCLUSION
This paper has presented an insider view of two NHS reorganisations that included mergers: first of PCGs and a community unit into CCPCT and second of CCPCT and ECPCT into CECPCT. Fulop and colleagues 11 argue that "mergers are based on simplistic notions of organisational change that do not take into account the dynamic relationship between the organisation and its context and between the organisation and the individuals within it" (p. 129). When adopting the decentred approach from Bevir and Waring, 7 it is clear that the different perspectives and interpretations given to the two mergers were shaped by and in turn shaped the different contexts. The policy context for the first reorganisation was the desire by the Labour government to relax public expenditure limits and invest in the NHS.
Moreover, the managerial approach was "softened" with a focus on quality and safety, service improvement, and the diffusion of best practices. 12 This significant shift meant that the creation of PCTs could make sense to clinicians, and in particular GPs who were sensitive about losing their autonomy as Fundholders. It also meant that these ideas helped to "sell" the benefits of joining the PCT to community staff and independent contractors. The structural change could be rephrased as one that preserved and bolstered clinical ambitions. This message needed to be consistently delivered by the PCT board and its leadership, repeated over time, and actual changes had to be tangible, like the premises developments. It took almost 2 years of discussion, contestation, and relapses into Fundholding or community unit modes to embed the new organisational culture of needs-led and value-based commissioning.
The second reorganisation illustrates the problems highlighted by a number of authors, 11, 13 in particular the lack of coherence between national policy objectives and local perspectives on priorities. Ferlie 12 argues that in 2005, the government appeared to return to a policy of choice and competition, and this apparently led to the idea of increasing the power of strategic commissioning by larger PCTs. 14 The structural change of merging two PCTs with very different organisational cultures and relationships with stakeholders never coincided with a change in attitudes. The ONG e943 feelings of take over by ECPCT on the one hand and the perception that CCPCT was "being dragged down by the financial problems of ECPCT" on the other were major obstacles to integration. These led to persistence of the Fundholding ethos in the former and attempts to return to prioritising professional over managerial decision making in the latter.
Fundamentally, the merger was seen to be imposed and untimely, fracturing the only recently embedded culture with its focus on population health and tackling inequalities. The resulting disharmony pervaded the organisation from top to bottom: my struggle to keep the board to act in a unitary manner, the PEC divided, and community staff retaining their Central versus East identities. It thus became difficult in the last 2 years of the PCT to cope with the external pressures, in particular the intensive scrutiny from the SHA, and this further inhibited the organisation to move forward as a cohesive unit.
My analysis leads me to conclude that a number of issues matter:
• Size: CCPCT covered a large geographical area and 30 GP practices but manageable in terms of building relationships with the PCT leadership. Through a sustained visiting programme, regular meetings, and an open door policy, we maintained visibility and kept a "finger on the pulse". The merger with ECPCT made this much more difficult as the geography doubled and the number of practices increased to 56. We never managed to stay in touch as before, and lost contact with CCPCT GPs and staff as well as not sufficiently connecting with the ECPCT constituency. Thus, mergers have to be calibrated carefully and ensure that it remains possible for the leadership to be visible and able to build relationships of trust.
• Timeliness: The increasing pace of change resulting from governments' symbolic desire to be seen to act 15 contradicts the time investment required to change organisational cultures. My examples show that in a medium to large-sized organisation like a PCT, 2 years is the minimum to embed new ways of thinking. The fragility of this process is highlighted by the second reorganisation whereby many of the earlier gains became undone as individuals and professional groups did not feel that the structural change made sense. The importance of assessing readiness for change cannot be stressed enough, 3 and incremental processes that have buy-in bottom up and top-down need to be in place.
• Money: Managing the money and having enough creates freedom to act, and the period between 2002 and 2006 attests to this. The PEC was able to encourage and support service innovation, the new premises provided opportunities to modify and/or expand service provision, and success oiled the relationship with the SHA. The merger to create CECPCT resulted in a different scenario whereby the focus shifted from improving health and well-being and service quality to tackling the financial deficit. The freedom the act narrowed over time leading to tensions and divisions across the organisation. While there will never be enough money for the NHS and choices have to be made, a certain degree of funding is necessary to meet the ever-changing needs of the population. Public health and scientific evidence should help to determine funding levels, alongside wider public debate and consideration of social care.
Iles 14 highlights the complexity of health care, and she turns this fundamental issue upside down. Instead of a technical, structuration response to complexity, she argues that we need a different starting point that does not necessarily privileges organisational change, creation of management hierarchies, and rules for accountability: "Another way of describing this cascading of detailed instructions is that it forces local managers to focus on the complicated easy (analyses, reports, ticking boxes, reading the guidance), leaving them little capacity or emotional energy for the simple hard. So they do not spend time on the acts of work and courage that will enable, support, and challenge those around them to be creative and energetic in pursuit of goals important to them as individuals and to the organisation and the people it serves" (p. 81).
In conclusion, the above account presents examples of productive (CCPCT) and unproductive (CECPCT) organisational change. While different participants in this particular history may hold a range of perspectives, most e944 ONG will concur with my conclusion that CCPCT achieved many of its objectives and that the organisational culture was a key positive factor. The uneven record of CECPCT can be attributed to the fact that the conditions were not present for the constituent PCTs to be receptive to change. As Bevir and Waring 7 explain, the narratives of the different actors involved in creating and sustaining the PCT conveyed different meanings and moral imperatives. Therefore, interests and cultures were not shared, and CECPCT failed to become a cohesive and purposeful organisation.
The lesson to draw from my account is that rather than seeing restructuring as the answer to the delivery of effective and efficient health care, it appears to be more realistic to work through people. Understanding their motivations, interests, and values is an important starting point. Staff can be energised by focusing on the core purpose of the NHS as improving the health and well-being of the population in equitable ways, and this should then guide decisions as to the shape of the organisations that deliver this vision. Involving communities in debates can be more meaningful as organisational objectives are then clearer. In the longer term, this might spare the NHS from unnecessary and unproductive organisational change processes.
| EPILOGUE
The coalition government came into power in 2010 and proposed a wholesale redisorganisation of the NHS. The
PCTs were abolished, and community services set up as stand-alone organisations or merge with acute or mental health trusts. Thus, many of the PCT gains had to be dismantled. I did not feel that I could support this and be a credible leader of whatever the successor body would become, and thus decided to stand down.
